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Abstract
I bet you don’t practice your philosophical intuitions. What’s your excuse? If you
think philosophical training improves the reliability of philosophical intuitions, then
practicing intuitions should improve them even further. I argue that philosophers’
reluctance to practice their intuitions highlights a tension in the way that they think
about the role of intuitions in philosophy.
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1
Do philosophers have more reliable intuitions than novices about philosophical mat-
ters? Do philosophers have expert intuitions? The idea that they do, or that they may
be assumed to, has recently been entertained by a number of philosophers for a num-
ber of reasons. One area in which there has been much discussion of this idea is in
debate about a so-called expertise defense of the use of intuitions in philosophy (see,
e.g., Ryberg 2013; Andow 2015). I think the expertise defense fails whether or not
this idea that philosophers are more reliable holds water. This paper is not about the
expertise defense. Nonetheless, it is instructive to give a quick overview of one aspect
of the debate about the expertise defense. It will give us some sense of the nature of
the claim that philosophers have more reliable intuitions.
To understand the expertise defense, we first need to outline what it is a defense of.
It is a defense of a practice, which I’ll call theMethod of Cases, in which philosophers
use intuitive judgments about cases as evidence in philosophical debates. The best
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way to elaborate on that brief characterization is via examples. Let me limit myself
to three.1
Permuted races What races are, or what they would be, is a central question in the
philosophy of race. It is an important question, in part, because without an answer one
cannot determine whether races exist. One route some philosophers have taken, to
find out what races are, is to be guided by our ordinary conception of race—probing
this using thought experiments to determine the extent to which our ordinary con-
ception tracks various factors. For example, Hardimon (2017) presents the following
case intended to demonstrate that our conception of races includes the notion that
races are ancestry groups. The intuition that seems to be playing an evidential role is
in bold. The crucial question, for Hardimon, is “whether it is conceptually possible
to have races (plural) that aren’t ancestry groups” and he continues,
This question can be addressed by supposing that—somehow!—a generation
of “black-looking” parents gives birth to a successor generation of “white-
looking” children, and that that generation. . . gives birth to a successor gener-
ation of “Asian-looking” children, and that that generation. . . gives birth to a
successor generation of “black-looking” children. We should also suppose that
this process repeats itself over and over again across many generations. Now,
in the permuted world, there would at any given time be groups of “white-
looking,” “black-looking,” and “Asian-looking” individuals. But from this, it
does not follow that these groups would constitute races. Moreover, I suspect
that people in the permuted world would over time cease to regard the groups—
the collections of white-looking, black-looking, and Asian-looking individuals
that resulted from this process—as races. It seems to me that this would be a
genuinely postracial world.
Last person Sylvan argued against Basic Chauvinism (Routley 1973):
one should be able to do what one wishes, providing (1) that one does not harm
other humans and (2) that one is not likely to harm oneself irreparably
His argument swings on some putative counterexamples. The most famous: 2
The last person surviving the collapse of the world system lays about them,
eliminating, as far as they can, every living thing, animal, or plant (but
painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What they do is quite permissi-
ble according to basic chauvinism, but on environmental grounds what they do
is wrong.
1Exactly how to characterize the relevant methodology and the notion of intuitions are issues of consid-
erable debate in the literature in philosophical methodology. For the sake of brevity, I won’t defend the
characterization given here. The point of this paper doesn’t hang on exactly how one construes the relevant
method or thinks about intuitions. The puzzle highlighted applies so long as the picture of philosophical
methods is one in which the intuitions philosophers have influences the theories they end up endors-
ing. Similarly, one could raise questions about my characterization of the methods involved in the three
examples given. However, this paper isn’t the place to provide that defense.
2Language of the original updated for clarity.
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This strategy can’t succeed unless the audience accept the claim in bold, and the
author expects us to accept this claim, presumably because it is so intuitive.
Family versus Orphanage Munoz-Darde´ (1999) looks for compelling reasons for
not abolishing the institution of the family, given that redistribution and regula-
tion arguably can not sufficiently compensate for the enduring effects of the initial
inequalities in circumstances that families impose, i.e., “severe contraints on meeting
fair equality of opportunity, or life chances, between people raised in different fami-
lies.” She considers a Rawlsian thought experiment in which we contrast two possible
models from the original position: in model 1, children would be raised in families,
social units in which “a group of elders are primarily responsible and have primary
authority over a particular group of children”; in model 2, the state has overall control
of childcare, an orphanage that is well-run to the extent that it is able to
equally guarantee to all children whichever conditions and principles are
considered optimum for their upbringing, as long as these conditions are
compatible with such an overall control.
Ultimately, she asks the reader,
I have assumed until now that the orphanage should be well-run. The question
is: how probable is that, were the familiy to entirely disappear? Would not my
fantasy of a generalized boarding school with teachers devoted to the individu-
ality of each child vanish, were the state to have sole control of the upbringing
of children?
urging us towards the tentative conclusion that “if generalized over many generations,
an orphanage could not be well-run” and that
complete abolition of [family] would probably pose such extreme threats to
individual liberty and capacity for self-determination, that it would defeat the
very purpose that made us envisage its substitution by a well-run orphan-
age. . . [i.e.,] to deliver greater equal opportunity for all. . . .
We are asked to use our intuition to determine the extent to which equality of
opportunity would be provided under the two models, a judgment which then plays
a key role in an argument that the family should not be abolished.
2
Why does such use of intuitions in philosophy need a defense? There are various
challenges one might make to such a method. However, the challenge that is rele-
vant for this paper concerns the reliability of intuitions. The reliability of intuitions
is crucial for this philosophical method: the less reliable the intuitions provided as
inputs, the less reliable the outputs of philosophical theorising using this method.
Recently, the reliability of intuitions has been challenged using a particular kind
of empirical finding. The relevant findings are those which suggest that intuitions
about philosophical matters may vary with irrelevant factors, e.g., framing effects and
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demographic effects (see, e.g., Wiegmann et al. 2012; Weinberg et al. 2001).3 Some
argue this is a sign that philosophical intuitions are unreliable. And if that’s right, this
generates a worry for the standard philosophical method of the method of cases.
Expertise defenses represent a particular way of resisting such worries. Numer-
ous philosophers have responded to such worries, and defended the use of intuitions
in philosophy by leaning on the idea of expert intuitions. The participants in the rel-
evant experiments are typically non-philosophers. If philosophers may be assumed
to have more reliable philosophical intuitions than the novices who are typically
the participants in such experiments, then one might think the challenge to standard
philosophical methodology may be resisted.
This is not a paper about expertise defenses and the line of thought I just pre-
sented is just one (rather unsophisticated) way of developing such a defense.4 What
is important for my purposes is that there is an attractive picture, accepted by many
philosophers, that philosophical training improves one’s philosophical intuitions.
This paper raises an important question for this idea. Once we take seriously the idea
that philosophers have more reliable intuitions due to their greater experience in the
field, a puzzle emerges.
3
Why might one expect philosophers to have more reliable philosophical intuitions?
One answer is straightforward. One expects experts to have more reliable intuitions
than novices about matters in their field of expertise. Chess experts have better intu-
itions than newcomers to the game. Mathematicians have a better intuitive sense for
the prospects of proof strategies than novices. Firefighters have better intuitions about
the likelihood of the collapse of a burning building. Weather forecasters have bet-
ter intuitions about what the weather will be like. The idea is that something about
having lots of experience in a field shapes and refines one’s intuitive capacities.
Of course, experience doesn’t always refine intuitions. In some domains, one
should expect refinement. In other domains, there is every reason to expect no
refinement at all. As Weinberg and Crowley (2009) put it:5
One of the most robust consensus findings of the study of expertise is that expert
judgments can only become more reliable where experts are readily confronted
3It is important to note that number of reported demographic effects have failed to replicate, see, e.g.,
Seyedsayamdost (2015a, b).
4Although this is not a paper about the expertise defense, the puzzle I articulate does create problems
for some versions of the defense. However, these problems pale in comparison with those it faces from
other quarters (see, e.g., Machery 2012; Schulz et al. 2011; Vaesen et al. 2013; Weinberg et al. 2010).
Any successful expertise defense has to deal with the growing number of experiments which suggest
philosophers’ intuitions also exhibit many signs of unreliability (e.g., Vaesen et al. 2013). Even if that
evidence did not exist, any successful defense would have to make clear why philosophical training should
be expected to make philosophers less likely to suffer from the specific types of effect highlighted by the
experimental work (e.g., framing effects) (Weinberg et al. 2010, makes this point clearly).
5Kahneman and Klein (2009) review the empirical literature on intuitive expertise in two research
traditions (heuristics and biases, and naturalistic decision making) and note similar themes.
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with clear, reliable feedback on which to train . . . The fields in which competent
experts routinely develop are those like meteorology, livestock judging, and
chess. In such areas, experts are confronted with a truly vast array of cases, with
clear verdicts swiftly realized across a wide range of degrees of complexity or
difficulty. (Weinberg and Crowley 2009, p.340)
If we are to base an assumption that philosophical training improves intuitions on
an analogy with other fields, then we had better pay attention to the details of that
analogy. It better be that philosophy resembles more closely cases like meteorology
or livestock judging than the case of horoscope writing.
One can be overly skeptical of the idea that philosophical training improves philo-
sophical intuitions. For example, Ryberg (2013) recently attempted to cast doubt on
the idea that an appropriate analogy can be drawn between philosophy (particularly
moral philosophy) and expertise-conducive fields such as those mentioned by Wein-
berg and Crowley (2009). Ryberg (2013) argues that, unlike in other fields, there is
no appropriate causal link between philosophers’ experience and intuitions, and that
philosophers receive no feedback about the quality of their intuitions. While some
skepticism is appropriate, I think Ryberg’s position goes too far.
As I have made clear in previous work (Andow 2015), there is no good rea-
son to doubt that philosophical training influences philosophers’ intuitions, and
philosophers actually get quite a lot of feedback about the quality of their intuitions.
Philosophers have much more experience than novices of considering thought exper-
iments, and receive feedback in the form of indirect external corroboration. The
feedback philosophers receive might not be sufficiently frequent, clear, or unam-
biguous to mean we should expect philosophers to be as superior to philosophical
novices as meteorologists are to novices in their field, but there is nonetheless reason
to expect some improvement as a result of their experience in philosophy.
It is tempting to conceptualize this greater experience that philosophers have in
terms of practice. One might say that philosophers should be expected to have more
reliable intuitions than novices because they have had a greater chance to practice
having intuitions about hypothetical cases and so on. However, I think it would be
misleading to think of philosophers’ greater experience in this way. I don’t think we
should think of philosophical training as involving a lot of intuition practice. It may
be true that a philosopher, all else being equal, will have had an intuition about a case
on more occasions than someone who has never studied philosophy. Nonetheless, I
contest, it is not right to say that philosophical training involves a lot of practicing
having intuitions about cases.
4
Let me present a basic case for the claim that philosophers don’t practice their
intuitions before dealing with some objections. The basic thought makes use of
an apparent disanalogy between philosophy and other fields. We do not practice
having intuitions in the same way musicians practice their scales, mathematicians
practice running through proofs, firefighters practice planning rescues from burning
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buildings, and weather forecasters practice predicting the weather. Not only do estab-
lished professors not do their intuition practice, but neither do graduate students, nor
undergraduate students.
Of course, philosophical training does involve a lot of practice of certain skills. We
practice writing essays, formulating arguments, assessing the validity of arguments,
drawing out the consequences of claims, constructing truth trees, and so on. And a
lot of this practicing involves having intuitions. But while a lot of the practicing that
we do on our way to being philosophers involves having intuitions, it doesn’t involve
active practicing of having intuitions.6
What would practicing having intuitions look like? Well, it would look like the
kind of practice involved in the development of other expert skills. One might sit
down with a list of hypothetical cases and simply practice having intuitions about
them in the same way that a mathematics student might sit down and practice solving
equations, or an experimental philosopher might practice running particular analyses
when learning to use a new statistics package. We might send our students home with
lists of philosophical cases—not to think through the consequences of saying certain
things about the cases, not to think through how various theories would apply to the
cases—simply to practice their skill of forming intuitive judgments about cases. Our
textbooks might contain banks of hypothetical cases included in online supplemental
materials: a resource for students to simply practice their intuitions out on.
We don’t do this. At no point in a philosopher’s career do we simply sit down
with a set of cases, and go through the motions of having intuitions about them, with
the purpose of improving our ability to make good intuitive judgments. Yes, we con-
sider cases when constructing arguments, assessing theories, and so on, but never for
the sake of practicing having intuitions about those cases. Yes, becoming a philoso-
pher involves encountering a whole host of cases, and developing a familiarity with
then, but cases students encounter in textbooks and classes are always embedded in
a dialectical context with salient connections to relevant theories or ideas: presented
not for practice but so students gain familiarity with kinds of case that play important
roles in the literature.
Why don’t we practice having intuitions? This lack of intuition practice in philoso-
phy might seem somewhat surprising. Given that practicing skills is typically a really
good way to refine them, and given that in other areas of expertise it is commonplace
for a training regime to incorporate formal practicing of the key skills required—why
is intuition practice absent from philosophy? Moreover, surely the need for practice
is even greater in philosophy than in other fields. As I have pointed out in previ-
ous work (Andow 2015), although philosophers get feedback about the quality of
their intuitions, and although the level of feedback might be sufficient to support
6One might be tempted to describe an expert as having some “intuitive” ability to write a good essay, as the
result of much practice. Similarly, a philosopher might have an “intuitive” sense of where to look to find
flaws in arguments. However, that is not the sense of an intuition which is relevant to the argument of this
paper. According to the relevant sense of intuition—although it is not possible to give a characterization
which is acceptable to all parties in philosophical methodology—an intuition is very roughly a judgment
that a particular case has or doesn’t have a particular philosophically interesting property.
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the assumption that philosophers’ intuitions are improved by their greater experi-
ence, philosophy is still in a pretty poor position in comparison with other fields.
The feedback we get about the quality of our intuitions is rarely fast, unambiguous
and completely reliable. As a result, it seems natural to think, philosophers should be
having to practice even more than those in other fields due to the comparative paucity
of sources of feedback about the quality of their intuitions.7
In the next section, I’ll consider and respond to some likely objections to the idea
that this lack of practice is somehow puzzling. But before we get to that, it is worth
just pausing to note that one might respond in a different way. I asked a question,
“Why don’t we practice having intuitions?” And, one’s response might be, “Good
question! What a peculiar oversight! I suppose we should start right away!”
5
Let me now anticipate and respond to a number of likely objections to the basic
argument sketched so far. The objections are variations on a theme. The thought is
that somehow we don’t need formal intuition practice or that it wouldn’t benefit us
enough to be worthwhile.
Objection #1: Informal “practice” is sufficient. Yes, we don’t deliberately and
explicitly practice our intuitions either as established philosophers or as philosophers-
in-training. It is not as if we engage explicitly in activities which have the dedicated
purpose of honing our intuition-having. However, many professional skills are not
developed in this way. For example, we get better at asking useful questions in talks
largely not by actively practicing doing so but by doing it a lot. Likewise, our intuition
practice happens during the course of everyday philosophizing and reflection. We
read papers, teach, discuss, argue and contemplate the subject matter, and all these
activities involve the practicing of intuition having. Whatever such practice we get is
sufficient.
Response: This seems a strange attitude. Many philosophers think intuitions are
the main, or a very important, source of evidence in philosophy.8 Given that sociolog-
ical fact it would seem odd if, given an optimized program of activities for philosophy
students, the potential for improving intuition would be so low a priority that for-
mal and structured training of intuition-having hardly featured on the program at all.
After all, wouldn’t developing one’s intuitive capacities be one of the main priorities
in a discipline that thought intuitions were (one of) the main source(s) of evidence?
7The lack of practice is going to be particularly difficult to explain for those who endorse certain versions
of the expertise defense. For it seems odd to, on the one hand, lean on the assumption that philosophers’
greater experience in philosophy results in their having more reliable intuitions than novices, while, on the
other hand, not incorporating any robust element of practicing having intuitions into standard philosophical
training. Such a philosopher should surely think it desirable to design philosophical training in order to
maximize students’ (and perhaps professors’ too) opportunities to gain such experiences, i.e., to build in
robust programs of intuition practice.
8Although there is a vocal minority who dissent (Cappelen 2012, 2014; Molyneux 2014; Earlenbaugh and
Molyneux 2009; Deutsch 2010, 2015)
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Perhaps informal practice is de facto sufficient for building a career in philosophy,
but that isn’t an excuse which has any normative force.
Objection #2: The reason that informal practice is sufficient is that the level of
intuitive expertise required in philosophy is relatively low. It may be that there are
gains to be had from practicing one’s intuitions in a more formal way. However, they
are not necessary given that the practice one can get informally, is enough for the
development of the low levels of expertise required.
Response: I certainly think it is reasonable to think that there is no need for
philosophers to devote as much time and effort to intuition practice as Olympic swim-
mers devote to practicing swimming. Moreover, it is plausible that the reason is that
the level of intuition expertise required to be a good philosopher is nothing like the
level of expertise required to be a world class swimmer. However, that thought by
itself doesn’t excuse philosophers from their intuition practice. Maybe we shouldn’t
be training to the same extent as Olympic athletes, but it is still strange that we don’t
bother with explicit training at all, surely some training would be appropriate. The
fact that we don’t have any program of intuition training would only make sense if
there was reason to endorse one of the following claims: (a) there are no significant
gains to be made through introducing formal intuition practice or (b) the time and
effort are better spent elsewhere.
Objection #3: Maybe there are no significant gains to be made through introducing
formal intuition practice.
Response: It might be, of course, that there are only minimal gains to be had from
formal intuition practice (above and beyond what informal practice can provide). The
lack of intuition training might be explained by considerations of bang for buck (or
of diminishing returns). It might be that the improvements to intuition-having to be
gained were so small (or diminished very quickly to being very small) that it made
little sense to recommend students spend any significant amount of their valuable
time practicing their intuitions. So perhaps the reason philosophers don’t do their
intuition practice is that the pay off is too small for the effort it would take. But this
again seems like a pretty weird excuse—especially from those who would defend the
idea that philosophers’ intuitions should be expected to be more reliable than those
of novices. It seems strange to (a) think that the gains provided by philosophical
training as currently practiced are significant enough to shout about, and yet (b)
doubt that building in concerted and focused intuition practice should be expected
to have anything except a negligible impact. Perhaps there is good empirical reason
to think that formalizing intuition practice in philosophy shouldn’t be expected to
achieve the gains over on-the-job practice that formal practice of skills achieves in
other domains. However, I know of no such reason.9
Objection #4: Maybe the time and effort are better spent elsewhere.
Response: Again, it might be the case that despite any gains to be made from
formal intuition practice, the time and effort such practice would take are better spent
9Issues of burden of proof can be difficult to settle. Here, I think the burden is easy enough to settle. Given
that we expect formal training to be able to afford significant advances on informal training in most other
areas, the burden is on the objector here to provide a reason to think philosophical intuitions should be
different.
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elsewhere. Students have a finite amount of time to acquire the skills and knowledge
they need to be philosophers. We can’t devote it all to intuition practice. So perhaps
the reason philosophers don’t do their intuition practice is that it isn’t the best use of
their time. However, absent a concrete account of what other activities—other than
improving one’s abilities vis-a`-vis the main source of evidence in philosophy—are
so valuable parts of a philosopher’s training that formal intuition practice makes no
appearance at all, I don’t think the mere possibility helps to make much sense of the
fact that philosophers don’t do their intuition practice.
6
You may or may not be convinced by my responses to the four objections above.
Suppose that you still want to push some such objection to my basic thought. I think
it is worth taking time to consider what this kind of objection concedes. I think
these kinds of objection—which aim to excuse philosophers from formal intuition
practice—already concede far more than most philosophers are likely to be willing
to concede. Each of the objections considered above concedes that, at least in princi-
ple, practicing one’s intuitions is a good idea. Each of the objections tries to come up
with an explanation for our failure to practice our intuitions and each of the objec-
tions appeals to considerations which are essentially practical, e.g., the gains would
be minimal, we don’t need to be any better than informal practice can achieve, and
so on. All of these responses concede that, given lots of time and resources, one good
way to become a better philosopher would be to engage in some formal intuition
practice.
My sense is that most philosophers will be suspicious of this idea. Indeed, I sus-
pect that to most readers of this paper the very idea of intuition practice will have
seemed bizarre right from the start. I certainly suspect that few will be going straight
to their next departmental meeting to propose a change to the curriculum. If that soci-
ological claim is right, then I don’t think that the objections considered above can
have much going for them as explanations as to why philosophy as a discipline and
philosophers as a group of people don’t do their intuition practice. I do not think it is
plausible that the reason we don’t do our intuition practice is due to any purely prac-
tical considerations that we have have explicitly or implicitly taken into account (as
individuals or as a profession).
7
So, why don’t philosophers do their intuition practice? I think the clue to a better
explanation goes something like this: to most philosophers the very idea of intuition
practice would seem like it could only be a symptom of a really weird understanding
of what role intuitions are playing in philosophy. I think that our collective distaste
for intuition practice betrays something important about our understanding of the role
that intuitions play in philosophy.
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There are various different hypotheses which could explain a collective distaste for
intuition practice. I don’t argue for any particular explanation in this paper. Nonethe-
less, I think it is important to give you a sense of the type of explanation which I have
in mind. So, in a moment, I will consider one particular idea in a little bit of detail.
First, however, I should briefly mention three other ideas which might have some
mileage. (1) Perhaps the reason that philosophers don’t do their intuition practice is
that they secretly recognize that intuitions are of no evidential value to begin with
and there’s no way to polish them up. (2) Perhaps philosophers don’t really think
intuitions play any important role in philosophy. (3) Perhaps philosophers think intu-
itions play an important role but it is not an evidential one. Each of those ideas could
potentially be used to explain why philosophers would have a distaste for intuition
practice.
The explanation I want to explore a little is that philosophers think (or at some
level are committed to the idea) that the intuitions which drive philosophy are
supposed to be untutored intuitions—when relying on intuitions in philosophy the
intuitions we rely on should ideally not be altered by our experience within philos-
ophy. This is not an eccentric metaphilosophical position among those who think
about the role of intuitions in philosophy, and it should be clear that a philosopher
with this sort of metaphilosophical commitment could excuse themselves fairly eas-
ily from intuition practice. Indeed, if intuition practice were to have any effect at all,
such a philosopher should view the effect of intuition practice as deleterious to their
abilities to do good philosophy. However, of course, if one is going to explain why
philosophers in general don’t do their intuition practice, then one can’t just focus
on those philosophers with convenient explicit metaphilosophical commitments. One
would also have to say that the rest of us (or a significant proportion of the rest of us)
in some sense share in these commitments (or at least that some such commitments
are implicit in our practice).
That said, although I don’t aim to defend it here, it is not so difficult to provide
some motivation for the idea that most/many philosophers think that the intuitions
which play an important role in philosophy are supposed to be untutored in some
important sense. One source of motivation can be found in the way we think about
our students’ intuitions. Which of us, when presenting our first year undergradu-
ates with hypothetical cases, experience receiving a barrage of faulty intuitions? Few
of us conceive of the responses we get in this way, I would contend, even when
they are unpredictable and strange. This is not to deny that novices often response
to philosophical cases in ways which are somehow off-target. Of course, it takes
students a while to become accustomed to the practice of considering hypothetical
cases. Trained philosophers will typically be quicker to understand the contours of
cases or will be less likely to be distracted by extraneous details. But this is not a
matter of their having a more reliable intuitive capacity, expert intuitions, trained intu-
itive responses, or anything similar. We don’t, I think, tend to think of this advance
in terms of our intuitions being better. Likewise, we wouldn’t tend to criticize the
novices for having bad intuitions, less reliable intuitions, or anything like that. Of
course, this might be a matter of politeness or pedagogical nous. However, it might
also be because we conceptualize the situation as one in which what students need
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to improve is not their intuitive capacities but their abilities to parse cases, recognize
relevant and irrelevant features of cases, and so on.10
A second source of motivation might be found in intuition-using philosophers’
typical reactions to certain kinds of project in experimental philosophy. There are
very many types of project within experimental philosophy. One which has received
a somewhat overblown press is the idea that philosophers’ own intuitions might be
supplemented by the intuitions of untutored subjects gathered empirically. The pro-
portion of actual experimental philosophy studies which take this form is fairly tiny.
But suppose that it was seriously on the table that we start using such experiments to
gather intuitions instead of relying on our own intuitions. Many philosophers would
probably have some worries about this proposal. But it is important to attend to the
nature of those worries. One type of worry concerns whether the relevant experiments
could reliably get at participants’ intuitions. Philosophical cases can be difficult to
grasp properly. How do we know the participants properly understand the relevant
issues? How do we know whether the participants are reporting their untutored intu-
itions rather than drawing on some theoretical model? These worries are not about
the reliability of untutored intuitions but about the reliability of the evidence about
untutored judgments. I’m inclined to think that this kind of worry would be the dom-
inant kind of worry in the minds of most who have concerns; if that is right, it speaks
to a metaphilosophical outlook which says that the intuitions which play a role in
philosophy should be untutored intuitions, but thinks that simply polling the folk is a
bad way to get at intuitions.
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I said that this paper would articulate a puzzle. What is the puzzle? The thought is
that of the following two positions the first is more attractive: (a) philosophy is just
like other fields, practice makes perfect, philosophers have more reliable intuitions
than novices; (b) philosophy is somehow different, there is no reason to expect that
philosophical training would somehow result in having intuitions of greater epistemic
value. And that of the following two positions, the first is more attractive: (c) being
pretty skeptical of the wisdom of intuition-training in philosophy; (d) being largely
in favor of the idea of incorporating much more intuition practice into the standard
philosophical education. The puzzle is that the natural pairs are (a) and (d) and (b)
and (c) both of which incorporate one of the less attractive positions.
I didn’t say I would solve the puzzle. And I won’t. My main conclusion is really
that philosophers who think intuitions play an important evidential role in philosophy
need to make a choice. My sense is that there is a tension in most philosopher’s
thinking about the role of intuitions in philosophy which will make this choice a
difficult one. This is a tension which the idea of doing one’s intuition practice helps
us to draw out. On the one hand, I think most philosophers would at least initially
10There are doubtless philosophers who do conceive of their students as having faulty intuitions. I don’t
contest that. But they are outliers.
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be reluctant to say that philosophy is importantly different from other domains in
this regard and slow to agree to the idea that, while experts in other domains should
be expected to have more reliable intuitions than novices, philosophers should not.
On the other hand, I think most philosophers will balk at the notion of intuition
practice—there is something wrong with that idea—if there is a way to improve
intuitions it surely isn’t to practice having intuitions! However, to reject intuition
practice is really to accept an important disanalogy between philosophy and other
fields. If there is reason to expect philosophers to have more reliable judgments than
novices which is analogous to the reason one might expect experts in other domains
to have more reliable intuitions, then intuition practice should work.
Why don’t philosophers do their intuition practice? Why don’t even the philoso-
phers who explicitly appeal to the idea that philosophical training improves one’s
intuitions do their intuition practice? I didn’t say I would solve the puzzle. But I do
have my suspicions about the likely solution. At some level, I suspect the vast major-
ity of philosophers don’t really think philosophical training improves intuitions—it
might improve something, but not intuitions. Some of course explicitly worry that
philosophical training pollutes, rather than enhances, our intuitions. And it may well
be that this sentiment is more widespread at some deep-seated level. Perhaps this
is what underlies our widespread failure to do our intuition practice. As I noted
above, many common reactions to certain projects in experimental philosophy and
to the judgments of relative philosophical novices seem to betray an understanding
that untrained untutored intuitions are the philosophically valuable intuitions and the
ones we want to guide our theorizing (even if we think that consulting intuitions of
untrained and untutored philosophical novices is a risky business because, e.g., it
is difficult to discern whether novices have fully and properly grasped the relevant
cases). However, for now, this is but one suggestion.
Perhaps you like the idea of intuition practice, but I suspect you do not.
What’s your excuse?
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